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FLORIDA'S CORPORATION LAWPROBLEMS AND PROPOSED REVISION
JACK

H.

CHAMBERS*

and

MIARTHA L. COCHRAN*

With the growth and increased sophistication of business enterprises and
the attendant pervasiveness and complexity of the federal regulatory scheme,
the corporate lawyer finds some comfort in the present move toward simplification and modernization of state corporation statutes. Streamlined modern
business corporation codes are now found in approximately thirty states.1
2
These acts reflect the trend toward codification in other areas of the law,
providing certainty in place of scant or ambiguous statutes and vague or
nonexistent case precedents. 3 Moreover, these new acts adhere to the current
legal thinking that, subject only to overriding interests of the state and third
parties, interested parties in any corporation should have maximum
flexibility in the conduct of business in whatever variations and modifica4
tions of the corporate form they may desire.
The current trend toward codification and flexibility has only recently
attained a prominent position in the drafting of corporate statutes. In the
mid-1800"s, with business expansion creating a pressing demand for more
charters, the enactment of general incorporation laws5 evidenced a desire
to avoid the scandals and favoritism incident to incorporation by special
act.6 The theme of equality of opportunity was expressed in these general
*

A.B. 1951, LL.B. 1953, Duke University: Member, Corporation Committee of the

Corporation, Banking, and Business Law Section of tie Florida Bar; Reporter to the Florida
Law Revision Council for the revision of Florida corporation law; Member, the Florida
Bar.
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1. See 1 W.

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA

OF CORPORATIONS

§2.2 (Supp. 1973). The Model

Business Corporation Act was used as the basis for corporation statute revisions in 23 states
and was employed to a great extent in the drafting of new acts in 11 additional states.
I AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION Acr ANN. §1, 2 (2d ed. 1971,
Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MBCA ANN.]. See text accompanying notes 158-160 infra.
2. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code codifying the law relating to commercial transactions has been adopted in 49 states.
3. See Wright & Baughman, Past and Present Trends in Corporation Law: Is Florida
in Step?, 2 U. MIAMI L. REv. 69, 98 (1947).
4. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, §2.2.
5. A general as distinguished from a special incorporation law provides that, after
statutory procedures are fulfilled, the issuance of a certificate of incorporation by an administrative official is automatic and nondiscretionary. Most commentators credit New
York with the adoption in 1848 of the first general incorporation act applicable to all types
of corporations. Wright & Baughman, supra note 3, at 79 n.17. Earlier statutes permitting
incorporation by administrative act were limited in scope, such as a 1784 Massachusetts
act providing for the incorporation of religious corporations and a 1796 New York act
applying to literary corporations. Id.
6. In many states these desires were carried forward in the enactment of constitutional
provisions prohibiting grants of special charters and requiring incorporation under general
laws. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art XIII (1838); N.Y. CONST. art. 8, §1 (1846).
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incorporation laws in the form of severe restrictions upon the size and
scope of corporate activity.7 By the late 1800's, however, these restrictions
had yielded to fiscal pressures. Whatever the impetus for the initial move, the
liberalization of corporate statutes by a few states and the resulting flow of
business to those jurisdictions" stimulated similar changes in other states
acting to prevent loss of revenue due to businesses incorporating elsewhere.9
Although Florida did not pass a general incorporation statute applicable
to all corporations until 1868,10 the first statute suggested a "stage of commercial and industrial development extending far beyond that existing in
Florida" at the time.,' This advanced statute probably can be attributed to
the influence of highly industrialized northern states after the Civil War. 2
Whatever the reason, Florida corporations under the 1868 statute were not
3
saddled with restrictions imposed in earlier years by most of the other states.1
Still, Florida never became a strong entry in the competition for corporate
charters;' 4 alluring provisions such as allowing minimal shareholder liabili7. For example, maximum limitations on the amount of capital permitted were common. In 1811 the maximum limit in New York was $100,000; until 1881, $2 million; and
until 1890, $5 million. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550 (1932) (Brandeis,

J., dissenting). Limitations on the scope of corporate powers also were prevalent; permission
to incorporate for "any lawful purpose" was not common until 1875. Id. at 555.
8. Id. at 558-60.
9. Id. See also Wright & Baughman, supra note 3, at 91-93.
10. Fla. Laws 1868, ch. 1639. FLA. CONsr. art. XIH, §1 (1838) provided: "The general
assembly shall pass a general law for the incorporation of all such churches and religious
or other societies, as may accept thereof; but no special act of incorporation thereof shall
be passed .... ." Under this authority Florida in 1846 adopted a general incorporation
act limited in scope to incorporation of towns, academies, religious soceties, libraries, and
fire companies. Fla. Laws 1846, ch. 84. Lodges were added by Fla. Laws 1854, ch. 663.
See Wright, Introduction to the Statutory Corporation Law of Florida, 18 FLA. STAT. ANN.
51, §7.
11. Wright, supra note 10, at 61.
12. Id.
13. For example, unlike the great majority of corporation statutes at that time, the
1868 act imposed no restriction on the residence or number of incorporators. There was
no maximum limitation on capital, although such limitations were prevalent in other
states. See note 7 supra. In addition, the 1868 act was second only to New York in providing for incorporation for "any lawful purpose." New York Laws 1866, ch. 838, at 1896,
cited in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 555 n.28 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Section 2 of the 1868 act limited corporate existence to 20 years, but this limitation was
quite common; in 1903 almost half of the states retained limitations on the duration of
corporate existence of from 20 to 50 years. Id. n.29.
14. Such honors were won by New Jersey, largely at the expense of New York, as a
result of an 1888 statute that conferred the general power of intercorporate stockholding.
See note 16 infra. Later, Delaware revised its laws, and when New Jersey then modified
its statutes to be more restrictive, Delaware became the most popular state for incorporation of large-scale interstate business. Sowards & Mofsky, Factors Affecting the Development
of CorporationLaw, 23 U. MIAM L. Rav. 476, 491-92 (1969). In his dissent in Louis K. Liggett
Co. v. Lee, Justice Brandeis pointed to other factors, such as the geographical location of
states, which along with low fees and a laxity of restrictions made certain states more
attractive for incorporation than others. 288 U.S. at 557 n.34. Probably more than its
geographical remoteness, Florida's failure to attract corporations under the 1868 act was
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ty 15 and permitting one corporation to hold shares in another" did not appear
in Florida until much later.
Florida corporation statutes have undergone two major revisions since
1868: one in 1925,17 and another in 1953.18 Although each revision sub-

stantially modernized existing Florida law, 19 each failed to carry out what
is now the prevailing theme in corporation statute drafting: providing a
streamlined and comprehensive code within which corporations may function with certainty and flexibility.20 Although a number of provisions from
modern acts have found their way into the Florida statute since the last
general revision, 1 the patchwork amendment process has compounded the
problems of the original law, yielding an illogically organized and, in some
instances, internally inconsistent corporate statute.22 This lack of logical
organization and the statute's silence on a number of subjects -3 are the two
major weaknesses in present Florida corporation law. This article will
examine these and other problems and discuss the need for a new corporation law for Florida.

attributable to the act's short tenure. In 1874, nine out of forty sections of the act were
repealed; five years later tile 1874 act was repealed, reviving those sections previously removed. Fla. Laws 1874, ch. 2016; Fla. Laws 1879, ch. 3165.
15. Section 22 of the 1868 act provided shareholder liability for debts of the corporation
up to the amount of stock owned by the shareholder, together with any amount unpaid
on his stock. In 1887 an amendment to the corporation statute limited shareholder liability
to ais amount equal to no more than the unpaid shares held by him. Fla. Laws 1887, ch.
3729.
16. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28,170, §1. New Jersey enacted the first statute permitting
intercorporate stockholding in 1888, conferring unconditional power in 1893. N.J. Laws
1888, chs. 269, 295; N.J. Laws 1893, ch. 171, cited in 288 U.S. 517, 556 n.32. Although New
Jersey's position as innovator of the holding company may be challenged by some commentators, e.g., Wright & Baughman, supra note 3, at 86-88, there is little doubt that, until
the adoption of the New Jersey law, any implied power to create such financial structures
was discouraged and, in many cases, specifically prohibited. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517, 556 n.32 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Wright & Baughman, supra note 3, at
88 n.38.
17. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10,096.
18. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28,17).
19. For example, the 1925 act provided for perpetual existence of corporations, voting
by proxy, and cumulative voting, and it added comprehensive new provisions on sales of
assets, consolidations and dissolutions. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10,096.
20. See Wright, supra note 10, at 66-98.
21. For example, in 1963 and 1970 Florida added comprehensive indemnification provisions patterned after the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT §5 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as MBCA]. FLA. STAT. §§608.13(14)-(17) (1973) (added by Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-286, §1; Fla.
Laws 1970, ch. 70-303, §2).
22. See note 157 infra.
23. For example, there are no provisions on directors' conflicts of interest, see text
accompanying note 67 infra, or stock rights and options, see text accompanying notes 34-37
infra.
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FLORIDA CORPORAION STATUTES: PRESENT INADEQUACIES

Corporate Financing
The finances necessary to launch a corporation are obtained principally,
at least initially, from the issuance of securities. Without comprehensive procedures governing the enforcement of stock subscriptions and the issuance
of shares, stock rights and options, the investor's liability to and rights in
and against the corporation will be uncertain. Florida's statute fails to consider a number of problems in corporate financing; thus, practitioners must
look outside the statute for guidance.
Like most modern states, Florida allows a great deal of flexibility in the
authorization and issuance of various classes and series of shares. 24 The procedure for establishing a series is not clear, however, and it appears that
Florida exceeds the latitude permitted by most states in allowing the board
of directors or the executive committee to establish a series without prior
authorization in the corporate charter.25 In addition, although the resolution
establishing a series may be filed with the state, thereby amending the charter,
it is not required to be. 28 Thus, the charter, the primary instrument for determining the various rights of shareholders in the corporation, may be incomplete with respect to the rights of holders of a certain series of shares.
The subject of stock subscriptions and the liability of subscribers and
shareholders also receives incomplete treatment in Florida's statute. There is
no requirement that stock subscriptions be in writing,27 and the revocability
or irrevocability of stock subscriptions is not enunciated. 28 In the case of a
defaulting subscriber, Florida provides that the corporation may auction his
shares, 29 but the statute does not state whether this remedy is exclusive or
24.

25.

FLA. STAT. §608.14(1) (1973).
Id. §608.14(2). Almost all states grant the board of directors power to issue shares

of preferred stock in different series, varying in terms to be set by the board. "Blank
stock" provisions eliminate the necessity for a shareholders' meeting to amend the articles,
thus freeing the board to act promptly when the securities market or the exigencies of
acquisitions of corporations or other properties so demand. However, along with the
desirable features of speed and flexibility, such provisions give the board of directors
power to dilute the interests of existing shareholders. Recognizing this, a majority of
states require that- some type of prior authorization be given to the board by shareholders
in the articles of incorporation. See MBCA §16 and discussion in 1 MBCA ANN. §16,
j 2-3.04 (2d ed. 1971).
26. FLA. STAT. §608.14(3) (1973).
27. But see MBCA §17.
28. Under Florida case law it is clear -only that once the corporation accepts, the
subscriber is liable for the amount of the subscription. Ocala Community Hotel Co. v.
Holloway, 103 Fla. 521, 137 So. 882 (1931); Perry Hotel Co. v. Courtney, 102 Fla. 1041, 136
So. 691 (1931).
-29. FLA. STAT. §608.16(2) (1973) provides that a corporation may sell at public auction
a sufficient number of shares of a defaulting subscriber to pay the installment due, with
incidental charges. If a receiver has been appointed "all unpaid subscriptions shall be
paid . . . as the receiver or the court may direct," subject to provisions of the subscription contract. Id. If the shares are auctioned there is no provision for disposition of any
excess of the proceeds realized over the amount due and unpaid on the shares.
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whether the corporation may enforce the subscription as it would a debt.3 0

In addition, where shares have been issued as partly paid, it is clear that
pledgees or other fiduciary holders of the unpaid shares are not personally
liable,31 but it is not specified with whom personal liability rests in such
cases.
Florida law provides that each shareholder is entitled to a certificate from
the corporation "certifying the number of shares thereof held of record by
him,"3 2 but there are no requirements for other information on the certificate,
such as the par value of shares, the name of the person to whom it is issued,
or transfer restrictions. Moreover, Florida does not require that a clarification
of the distinguishing rights and characteristics among the various classes
33
of stock be made available to each certificate holder.
The issuance of stock rights and options is common with most corporations, yet Florida's statute is virtually silent in this area. 34 Most practitioners
overcome this omission by finding authorization for stock rights in the
general statutory authority to enter contracts necessary and proper for the
conduct of business.3 This approach, however, leaves unanswered such questions as whether instruments evidencing stock rights and options are required
and what type of consideration must be given. Thus, holders of stock rights
may be unprotected, and decisions of management may be open to litigation.3G
Because options are frequently granted to employees, officers, and directors
as a means of incentive and compensation, comprehensive regulation in this
area is particularly important.After the issuance of shares, a determination of the amount of stated
capital of a corporation is important with respect to at least two corporate
activities: the corporation's purchase of its own shares and the payment of

dividends.3

In each of these instances, funds for the purchases or dividends

30. Florida case law provides that the corporation may maintain an action on the
subscription contract on the basis of an express promise, Barbee v. Jacksonville & Alligator

Plank Rd. Co., 6 Fla. 262 (1855), or an implied promise to pay for the stock, Kirksey v.
Florida & Ga. Plank Rd. Co., 7 Fla. 23 (1857).
31. FLA. STAT. §608.45 (1973).
32. Id. §608.41.
33. Although the elimination of stock certificates might be desirable for reasons of
efficiency and convenience, all present corporate legislation entitles shareholders to certificates
representing shares. 1 MBCA ANN. §23, 2 (2d ed. 1971). MBCA §23 requires that the
(ertificates either inform the shareholder of his rights or state that a full statement of
his rights will be made available upon his request.
34. Florida even fails to mention stock rights and options in the corporate powers
section. See FLA. STAT. §608.13 (1973).
35. FLA. STAT. §608.13(7) (1973). See Tribble v. JAV. Greer Co., 83 F. Supp. 1015 (D.
Mass. 1949).
36. See Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct.).
reargument denied, 33 Del. Ch. 174, 91 A.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (litigation regarding the
adequacy of consideration for employee stock options).
37. Modern statutes provide for shareholder approval of such methods of compensation.
E.g., MBCA §20.

38. See FL k. STAT. §§608.13(9)(b), .52 (1973).
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must come from surplus rather than capital.39 Yet Florida law leaves to
speculation a number of questions concerning the determination of stated
capital. Where shares without par value are issued, the statute directs that
capital be determined by "the aggregate consideration received," 40 apparently
precluding allocation between stated capital and surplus. Where par value
shares are issued, the treatment of excess consideration over par value is not
articulated.4 1 Finally, although Florida provides that either the stockholders
or the board of directors may make "transfers to capital,"4 2 the procedure
for making such transfers is unspecified.
Shareholders Participation
Statutory procedures for shareholder meetings and the voting of shares
insure meaningful delegation of management functions by shareholder-owners. On this subject, however, Florida law is silent or ambiguous in a number
of respects. For example, there is no specific requirement for an annual
meeting of shareholders; the necessity for such a meeting is merely implied
in the requirement that directors "shall be chosen at the annual meeting of
stockholders." 43 There also are numerous silences with respect to setting
record dates and closing stock transfer books. Although a provision does
exist for fixing a record date for determining the stockholders entitled to
vote 4 4 there is no authorization for setting a record date for determining
the payment of dividends, for fixing a new record date prior to an adjourned
meeting, or for providing a record date when the directors have not set
one. In addition, there is no procedure for closing the stock transfer books as
a means of determining the shareholders of the corporation as of a particular
date.

39. Id. Florida does not differentiate between earned and capital surplus, however. Most
corporation statutes recognize that surplus may arise in two ways. It may arise from the
operations of the business, in which case it is called earned surplus, or it may arise from
certain capital transactions, such as the sale of stock for consideration in excess of par
value. 1 MBOA ANN,. §§2(/, (m), 2, 3.02, 3.03(6)(7) (2d ed. 1971). Under the MBCA no
distributions may be made from capital surplus without authorization in the articles of
incorporation or the vote of the holders of a majority of outstanding shares. MBGA §§6, 46.
See also MBGA ANN. §6, 2; §46, 2 (2d ed. 1971). Thus, the Model Act adheres to "the
classic concept that current earnings are available for distribution to shareholders while
capital should be maintained intact until the shareholders take some action to authorize
a different course." 1 MBCA ANN. §2, 2, at 35 (2d ed. 1971). Virginia modified the Model
Act provision by allowing dividends to be paid out of capital surplus, so long as the
source of such dividends is identified to the stockholders concurrently with the distribution. VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-43(a) (1974).
40. FLA. STAT. §608.17 (1973).
41. Id. See MBGA §21.

42. FLA. STAT. §608.17 (1973).
43. Id. §608.08(1). The statute does not set forth a procedure for fixing an annual
meeting date or selecting the place of the meeting. Florida's statute also omits procedures
for calling special meetings.

44. Id. §608.10(2).
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Voting rights are enhanced by statutes that guarantee the right of stockholders to see books of record.4 5 Florida's scant statute provides only that
the books of record must be produced at a stockholders' meeting upon the request of any stockholder.46 As a practical matter, it would be difficult to
determine current stock ownership from stock transfer books during a stockholders' meeting. Although the keeping of a list of stockholders is required,
such a list is not available for inspection by all stockholders.4 7 Shareholders
under Florida law are further hindered in knowledgeably exercising their
voting rights by the absence of a requirement that corporations keep books
of account or minutes of shareholder or board of directors meetings. Moreover, the statute provides no method for shareholders to obtain corporate
financial statements without first securing a court order.48
Quorum requirements for shareholders' meetings commonly are found in
corporation statutes, 49 yet the Florida quorum statute renders this particular
protective device somewhat illusory. Section 608.10(4) of the Florida Statutes
provides that a quorum is constituted by a majority of the stock entitled to

vote "unless the certificate of incorporation or by-laws otherwise provide.'"'5
Thus, the board of directors might adopt a bylaw prescribing a quorum of
much less than a majority of the stock.51
2
To a large extent the regulation of proxies occurs on the federal level.
All states permit voting by proxy, but few have comprehensive legislation." 3
Florida, like most states, must answer the numerous questions relating to
proxy voting by looking to common law agency principles.5 4 A growing
minority of states, however, give statutory recognition to principles that
45. See, e.g., 1 MBCA ANN. §31, %2; §52, %2 (2d ed. 1971).
46. FLA. STAT. §608.10(3) (1973).
47 Id. §608.39(1) (1973). The list may be inspected by any judgment creditor of the
corporation, any person who has held of record at least 1% of the corporation's outstanding
shares, or any person holding or authorized in writing by the holders of at least 5% of the
outstanding shares. Id.
48. Id. §608.39(4).
49. See 1 MBCA ANN. §32, 112 (2d ed. 1971).
50. FLA. SrAT. §608.10(4) (1973) (emphasis added).
51. Florida does have minimum voting requirements with respect to various corporate
activities. For example, FLA. STAT. §§608.19, .27 (1973) provide respectively for a majority
vote of all the outstanding stock for sales of assets and voluntary dissolutions. Where
amendments would decrease the amount payable as a preference to or adversely affect the
rights of any "kind, class or series" of stock, a majority vote of each kind, class, or series
is required for affirmation. FLA. STAT. §608.18(l)-(2) (1973). In the ordinary case, however,
such protection is not present.
52. See SEC Rule 14(a), 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-2 (1973). The solicitation of proxies is
regulated where shares are listed on a national exchange or where the corporation's assets
exceed $1 million and its equity securities are held of record by 500 or more shareholders.
53. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §608.10(5) (1973). The Florida statute merely provides that
proxies must be in writing and clarifies the procedure for voting a proxy held by two or
more persons. Id.
54. For example, proxies, like other agencies, generally are revocable at the pleasure
of the shareholder giving the proxy. Upon the death or incompetence of the proxy-giver or
principal, the authority of his agent, the proxy-holder, is terminated. See H. FIENN, LAW
Or COm'ORATsONs

383 (1970).
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have evolved from case law.55 Thus, in place of judicial pronouncements on
the irrevocability of proxies when "coupled with an interest" or "given as
security," practitioners in those states find statutes that state specifically the
conditions necessary to create an irrevocable proxy.56 Other recurring questions, such as the duration of proxies and the voting status of shares purchased without notice of a proxy, also may be answered by statute.57 Florida's
statutory silence, along with the dearth of Florida case law in the area,
results in needless uncertainty for practitioners.
In addition to the substantial lack of statutory rules governing proxies,
Florida's statute has many other gaps concerning the voting of shares.
There is only a general reference to cumulative voting.58 Also lacking are
procedures for the voting of shares held by another corporation or for the
voting of pledged shares,55 and clarification of the voting authority of various
fiduciaries to vote shares held by them.60 Additionally, there is no provision
for the cessation of voting rights of holders of redeemable shares. 61
Finally, although Florida does have detailed treatment of the method of
creating voting trusts, 62 the statute is unique in its approach. For example,
there is no requirement that legal title to the shares be transferred to the

55. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §22-610 (1970); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §609 (McKinney 1963).
56. New York provides for an irrevocable proxy where the proxy is made expressly irrevocable and where it is held by a pledgee, a person who has agreed to purchase the
shares, certain creditors, an officer (if his employment contract provides for the proxy),
or a person designated under certain shareholder voting agreements. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§609(f) (McKinney 1963).
57. Id. §§609(b)-(d).
58. FLA. STAT. §608.03(2)(j) (1973) permits inclusion in the articles of incorporation
of certain provisions "including . . . provision for cumulative voting for directors."
59. As in other situations in which more than one interest exists in shares to be
voted, it is important both for those possessing such interests and for the corporation that
the voting rights of the respective parties in interest be clearly defined.
60. MBCA §33 handles this problem by providing that where the fiduciary has not
been judicially chosen, as in the case of a trustee named by a settlor, he should be entitled
to vote only those shares held by him transferred into his name. On the other hand,
where the shares are held in the name of a judicially nominated fiduciary, the authority
to act is evidenced by the court order appointing him. Moreover, the latter's functions,
which necessarily involve the -voting of shares, are for the most part relatively short-lived.
Thus, there are no practical reasons for requiring that he hold the shares of record. 1
ME1BCA ANN. §33,
6, 7, 112 (2d ed. 1971).
61. MBCA §33 provides that after notice to holders of redeemable shares and deposit
of a sum sufficient to redeem their shares, the shares shall not be entitled to vote nor shall
they be considered outstanding shares. The comments to that section explain: "Redemption
of redeemable shares frequently occurs in conjunction with a corporate transaction . . .
with respect to which the vote of the shares being redeemed would be required. . . . If
the shares are to be redeemed in such a transaction, it serves no useful purpose to secure
their concurrence so long as the holders are assured that adequate provision has been
made for their receiving the amount payable to them on redemption." 1 MBCA ANN. §33,
9(2) (2d ed. 1971).
62. FLA. STAT. §608A3 (1973).
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voting trustee. 63 "Shareholders' agreements" are not authorized, except for
6
shareholders of close corporations. 4
Management Responsibilities
The exercise of management responsibilities by officers and directors
demands comprehensive treatment in corporation statutes. Not only should
there be adequate safeguards for the protection of investors, but management
requires guidelines within which it may exercise its fiduciary duties with
minimal exposure to liability. Florida's statutory provisions dealing with
directors' liability and shareholder derivative actions are extensive, 5 the
only notable omission being the failure to provide liability where an insolvent
corporation purchases its own shaes.66 There is an absence of statutory guidelines, however, for determining the validity of certain transactions involving
conflicts of interest, such as transactions between a corporation and one or
more of its directors, between corporations having common directors, or
between a corporation and another entity in which a director is financially
interested. 67 The few Florida decisions in this area leave many questions unanswered.6s

There are also numerous organizational problems and inconsistencies in
the structure of Florida's corporation law. The relevant provisions for determining the number and election of directors are scattered through five
different sections of the Florida Statutes.69 While the board of directors may
consist of only one person, 70 there must be two or more persons in an executive committee, 71 and every corporation must have three designated officers,
with the president prohibited from holding the office of secretary or assistant
secretary.7 2 There are no guidelines for place and notice of directors' meet63. Id. §608.43(3). The agreements are recorded in the corporation minutes and a
specific notation is made on the stock certificate. Id. §608.43(2). There is no provision for
extension of the voting trust agreement.
64. Id. §608.75.
65. Id. §§608.53-.58 (1973) (director liability); id. §608.131(2) (derivative actions).
66. Florida does provide for directors' liability when directors of an insolvent corporation declare dividends and for liability where an insolvent corporation transfers property
to stockholders. FLA. STAr. §§608.53-.55 (1973). Most modern statutes recognize that there
should be similar liability when an insolvent corporation purchases its own shares because
both the purchase of its own shares and the payment of dividends are distributions of the
corporation's assets to existing shareholders, which decrease an), amount available for distribution to creditors. See 2 MBCA ANN. §48(b), I 2, 3.01-.02 (2d ed. 1971).
67. Such guidelines should specify whether an interested director may be counted in
a quorum, whether he may vote on a subject, and whether an action is void or voidable if
it is basically fair and reasonable. See MBCA §41.
68. See, e.g., Pierce v. Scott. 142 Fla. 581, 195 So. 160 (1940). Florida courts prescribe
a "good faith" standard for determining whether transactions involving director conflicts
of interest are voidable. Id.
69. FLA. STAT. §§608.(2)(g), .08, .09(1), .13(6), .51 (1973).
70. Id. §608.09(1).

71. Id. §608.09(2). Apparently, executive committees may handle extraordinary matters
as well as the day-to-day management of the corporation.
72. Id. §608.40.
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ings, the only reference stating that they may be held "within or without the
state."7 3 An obvious problem inheres in the provision that directors may not
adopt bylaws inconsistent with bylaws adopted by stockholders.74 To insure
compliance with this provision, every Florida corporation should maintain
a record of bylaws adopted by each group.
Other provisions currently found in modem statutes are lacking in the
Florida law. For example, there is no provision for management of a corporation by persons other than the directors,7 5 nor are there procedures for removal of directors with or without cause7 or for the removal of officers. 7 7 In
addition, most modern statutes provide that the articles of incorporation
may require more than a majority of the members of the board of directors
for a quorum, or may require a vote of more than a majority of directors
present to constitute an act of the corporation.78 Florida's statute apparently
allows a quorum of less than a majority of the total number of directors.7 9
Within statutorily prescribed maximum limits, directors generally have
wide discretion in the payment of dividends. The limits almost universally
imposed reflect the traditional goal of keeping the capital of the corporation
intact for the benefit of creditors and other third parties who deal with the
corporation. 0 Florida adheres to these limits, permitting the payment of
dividends only out of the "net earnings" or "surplus of the assets over the
liabilities including capital."8 1 A number of states, however, have gone further
in the protection of shareholder interests by requiring that shareholders be
informed of the source of dividends when the source is not profit from corporate earnings but rather is a distribution of capital surplus.s 2 Florida does
not follow this line. In addition, the Florida statute fails to treat transfers to
capital in the case of stock dividends1s

73. Id. §608.09(1). Left unanswered are questions regarding the required notice, waiver
of notice, the calling of director's meetings, and the adjournment of such meetings. Cf.
MIBCA §43.
74. FLA. STAT. §608.07 (1973).
75. FLA. STAT. §608.09(1) (1973) requires that the management of general corporations

be by the board of directors. In the case of close corporations, however, the articles may
provide that the stockholders are deemed directors. Id. §608.72.
76. This is allowed only for close corporations, absent a contrary provision by agreement or in the bylaws or articles of incorporation. FLA. STAT. §608.76 (1973). See Frank
v. Anthony, 107 So. 2d 136 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). There are several considerations that may
be overlooked by a bylaw or articles provision, however. For example, when a director
has been elected as a result of cumulative voting or when holders of the shares of any
class are entitled to elect one or more directors, special provision should be made for the
protection of minority rights. See MBCA §39.
77. One Florida court has held that directors may remove the president without
cause or notice. Frank v. Anthony, 107 So. 2d 136 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
78. See MBCA §40; 1 MBCA ANN. §40, 1112, 3 (2d ed. 1971).
79. See FLA. STAT. §608.09(1) (1973).
80. See MBGA §45; 1 .MBCA ANN. §45(a),

81.
ever.
82.
83.

FLA.

STAT.

2 (2d ed. 1971).

§608.52 (1973). These terms are not further defined in the statute, how-

See MBCA §46; 1 MBCA ANN. §46, 2 (2d ed. 1971). See note 39 supra.
FLA. STAT. §608.52 (1973) provides only that "dividends may be paid in stock."
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Consistent with its policy of protecting creditors, Florida's statute prohibits the payment of dividends by an "insolvent" corporation.8 4 However,
chapter 608 has no general definitions section and nowhere in the statute is
the term "insolvent" clarified. The provision allowing the payment of
dividends from the "surplus of assets over the liabilities including capital" 5
implies that, at least as it relates to limitations on dividends, insolvency
occurs when the corporation's assets are less than its liabilities, including
capital. 86 Another section, however, which prohibits certain "transfers in contemplation of [a corporation's] insolvency, ' ' indicates that the cash flow
test or "inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they become due"'88
may determine insolvency. s9 Thus, needless uncertainty results from the
statute's simple failure to define terms. 90
Incorporation
Although early general incorporation laws placed a great deal of emphasis
on preincorporation procedure, modern statutes emphasize simplicity in effect-

ing incorporation. 91 The de facto incorporation doctrine may have been justified when, without such judicial innovation, failure to comply with lengthy
preincorporation procedures often led to harsh results. 92 If procedures for
incorporation are simple, however, perpetuation of the de facto doctrine
only creates uncertainty in the determination of corporate existence. Thus,
the general trend is toward abolition of the doctrine. 93 Florida, however, retains it.", Moreover, where modern statutes provide that the certificate of
incorporation conclusively proves corporate existence,9a Florida again opts
for uncertainty and attributes only prima facie status to the certificate. 96
Florida is out of step with modern statutes in a number of other areas relating to incorporation. For example, the requirement that incorporators
have "capacity to contract"9 introduces a factually dependent legal standard
that might subject corporate existence to uncertainty. In addition, Florida
84. Id. §608.53.
85. Id. §608.52.
86. Id. See the discussion in I MBCA ANN. §45(a), 2, at 890-91 (2d ed. 1971).
87. FLA. STAT. §608.55 (1973).
88. This is the test used in MBCA §2 (n).
89. FLA. STAT. §608.55 (1973) prohibits transfers by a corporation to its officers, directors,
or stockholders where the corporation has "refused to pay any of its notes or other obligations
when due."
90. The comments to MBCA §2 note that the inclusion of definitions sections in statutes
is a recent development. Such sections contribute to the over-all clarity of a statute and
eliminate repetition. I MBCA ANN. §2, 12 (2d ed. 1971).
91. See the comment to MBCA §55, 2 MBCA ANN. §55, 12 (2d ed. 1971).
92. See generally Carpenter, De Facto Corporations, 25 HARV. L. REv. 623 (1925).
93. 2 MBCA ANN. §56, 2 (2d ed. 1971).
94. FLA. STAT. §608.50 (1973). See, e.g., Municipal Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Bishop's
Harbor Drainage Dist., 17 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1944).
95. See, e.g., MBCA §56; 2 MBCA ANN. §56, 3.01 (2d ed. 1971).
96. FLA. STAT. §608.06 (1973).
97. Id. §608.03(4).
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requires that incorporators be "natural" persons, 9 thus precluding a corporation from serving in such a capacity even though it may be the real party in
interest.
Florida is in line with modern statutes in permitting incorporators to
stipulate the date upon which corporate existence commences.9 9 However, not
only may the beginning of corporate existence occur any time within ninety
days after the filing of the articles, but it also may relate back to the time of
signing the articles if the articles are filed within five days after being signed.10
This relation-back provision diminishes the value of filling as evidence of
corporate existence and affords opportunities for uncertainty or even fraud.10'
Amendments
Generally speaking, the articles of incorporation constitute the contract
between shareholders and a corporation. Shareholders invest with the expectation that the directors will manage day-to-day corporate affairs in accordance
with the articles; changes in the contract by amendment require further investor participation. 102 Thus, all corporation statutes provide for shareholder
voting on amendments and most provide further protection for shareholders
03
through notice requirements and provisions for class voting.
Procedures for amendments to certificates of incorporation are set forth
in a lengthy section of the Florida Statutes, 0 4 which, although fairly- comprehensive, fails to include a number of useful provisions found in other
corporation statutes. For example, class voting is provided upon two occurrences: it is required where the proposed amendment would decrease the
amount payable as a preference and where the amendment would "otherwise
adversely affect the rights of any kind, class or series of stock."' 0 5 Because
the question of advantage or disadvantage may be a question of judgment
on the facts, most modem statutes allow class voting where the proposed
amendment would in any way affect the class, thus removing the ambiguous
06
and possibly litigious standard.
Florida allows the adoption of amendments without shareholder approval
for railroads ordered to reorganize under the National Bankruptcy Act,' 07 but
there is no similar provision for reorganizations of general corporations. Although the Bankruptcy Act authorizes amendment of the charter of a debtor
98. Id. §608.03(1).
99. Id. §608.04.
100. Id.
101. For example, an unincorporated sole proprietor might protect himself against
personal liability for the tortious conduct of an employee by predating articles of incorporation to a time immediately prior to the commission of the tort.
102. Although Florida does not have such a provision, a number of states provide for
the adoption of amendments by directors before the issuance of shares. See 2 MBCA ANN.
§59, 3.02 (2d ed. 1971).
103. Id.
104. FLA. STAT. §608.18 (1973).
-105. Id. §608.18(1) (emphasis added).
106. See MBCA §60; 2 MBCA ANN. §60, I5.01-.02 (2d ed. 1971, Supp. 1973).
107. FLA. STAT. §608.261 (1973).
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corporation as part of a plan of reorganization submitted to the court, the
charter must be amended in accordance with the law of the state that granted
it. Thus, most major industrial states have adopted provisions that interface
the federal law and establish procedures for state recognition of the amendment.O8
After adoption of an amendment, Florida law requires only that a copy
of the amendment be filed. 10 9 In many cases, the amendment itself may be
unclear regarding the manner in which certain changes will be effected.
Recognizing this, an increasing number of states require the filing of "articles
of amendment," which include, among other things, information concerning
changes in the capital structure of the corporation, the method of exchange,
reclassification or cancellation of issued shares, and the manner in which
stated capital may be affected by the amendment. 110 Apparently, the procedure for reducing capital in Florida is identical to that for amending the
articles of incorporation generally. A copy of the amendment that affects the
reduction must be filed with the state,"' but there is no requirement for
further disclosure of the effect of the amendment, such as the amount of the
corporation's stated capital after the reduction.
Florida is among the few states that do not deal with redemption and
cancellation of reacquired shares in a comprehensive manner. The only
specific reference to redemption is section 608.18(7), which states: "Unless
specifically otherwise provided . . . (b) Whenever any shares of stock are
redeemed or otherwise retired, other shares may be issued in lieu thereof."
The statute further provides limitations for any "reduction in capital involving
[a] distribution among stockholders,' "'
which presumably apply to redeiptions of shares. Again, there is no requirement for filing with the state information relating to the changes in the corporation's capital structure.
lerger,Consolidation,Sale of Assets
The rationale for requiring shareholder approval for amendments extends as well to other extraordinary corporate matters. Decisions to engage
in mergers, consolidations, and sales of substantially all of the assets of a
corporation are not included in the day-to-day management responsibilities
delegated by shareholders to directors. They are in a sense organic changes
calling for shareholder participation and for consideration of minority shareholders' interests. Although fairly comprehensive in this area, the Florida
corporation statute lacks protection for shareholders in several respects, and
fails to provide procedures for disposing of problem situations that may arise
in such extraordinary corporate actions. In addition, although similar results
108. Cf. 2 MBCA ANN. §65, 12 (2d ed. 1971). See Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties
in the New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 363 (1958).
109. FLA. STAT. §608.18(2) (1973).
110. See 2 MBCA ANN. §61, 183.01-.02 (2d ed. 1971, Supp. 1973).
111. FLA. STAT. §§608.18(2), (5) (1973). The statute prescribes a minimum amount below which capital may not be reduced. Id. §608.18(5).
112. Id. §608.18(6).
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may be accomplished by amendments, mergers, consolidations, or sales of assets,
there is a disparity in statutory safeguards provided under these various proceedings.
Florida's statute requires approval at a meeting of stockholders for the
adoption of merger or consolidation agreements, 1 3 and further provides for
notice and a statement of the purpose of the meeting." 4 Any protection
rendered by these requirements is necessarily incomplete, however, because
shareholders are not assured an opportunity to study the plan or a summary
of the plan prior to voting."1 The sale of corporate assets provisions are
similarly deficient."
Although Florida provides for rights of appraisal for dissenters to mergers
or consolidations: 7 there is no statutory obligation on the part of corporations to inform shareholders of such rights. In addition, results similar in
effect to a merger or consolidation may be accomplished by a sale of al or
substantially all of the assets of a corporation. The statute, however, provides
no dissenters' rights in such circumstances."18 As another example of the disparity in the treatment of corporate matters that may produce similar results,
class voting is provided in the case of amendments," 9 but there is no such pro120
tection in the case of mergers, consolidations, or sales of corporate assets.
After the board of directors -secures shareholder approval for a plan of
merger, consolidation, or sale of assets, later events may show the plan to be
unwise. When the agreement approved by the shareholders does not provide
for such contingencies, it is unclear whether the directors have fulfilled their
fiduciary duties if they abandon the plan without additional shareholder
approval, or whether it is a breach of their fiduciary duties to continue with
the plan. Modern statutes insure the unfettered business judgment of directors by providing for abandonment of the plan after shareholder approval. 21 Florida's statute does not deal with this issue, and case law offers
no guidance.
Other convenient provisions found in modern statutes are missing from
the Florida scheme. There is no provision for a "short-form" merger without
2
shareholder approval when a subsidiary merges into its parent corporation. 2
Modern statutes recognize that the vote of minority shareholders could not
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. §608.20(2).
Id.
But see MBCA §73.
FLA. STAT. §608.19(1) (1973).

117. Id. §608.23(1).
118. Limited rights are provided in the case of a sale in the course of dissolution.
Id. §608.30(3)(b). Where, instead of distributing the remaining assets among shareholders,
the directors (as trustees) upon written consent of a majority of the shareholders sell the
remaining assets to a corporation and take payment in stocks or bonds, the shareholders
who did not consent can make written demand for payment in fair cash value. Id.

119. Id. §608.18(1).
120. The sale of assets provision refers to class voting only in the context of greater
than majority votes required by the articles of incorporation. FLA. STAT. §608.19(1) (1973).
121. E.g., MBCA §73; 2 MBCA ANN. §73, 3.01 (Supp. 1973).
122. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. §253 (1972).
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prevent the merger in such a case, and, consequently, securing their approval
would be an unnecessary inconvenience .1 23 Florida has no provision enabling
a shareholder to dissent as to some, but not all, of his shares. 124 Such a provision is particularly helpful where a particular record owner is a nominee
or fiduciary for various beneficial owners. Where a dissenting shareholder has
made a demand for fair cash value, the Florida statute provides that all rights
shall cease with respect to his stock unless the merger or consolidation is
abandoned."2 Apparently, there is no procedure for the withdrawal of demand, even if the corporation consents to it. Finally, under the Florida
statutes it appears that each dissenting stockholder is entitled to a separate
judgment by the circuit court as to the value of his stock."26 Modern statutes
eliminate needless litigation by providing that all dissenting shareholders
shall be made parties to one such proceeding."12Dissolution
To insure compliance with various state policies relating to corporations,
virtually all jurisdictions provide for involuntary dissolution of a corporation by the state as a policing action. 1 28 Events triggering dissolution under
state corporation statutes range from failure to maintain a registered office
and failure to pay taxes to "abuse of authority. ' ' 1 9 The Florida corporation
statute provides for dissolution by the state only where the corporation has
iailed to file an annual report and pay the five dollar annual report filing
fee. 30 The provisions dealing with the report filing fee are lengthy and
cumbersome, particularly in light of the fact that there are no statutory procedures for dissolution where the violation of state policy is extreme."'
Shareholders also have the power to bring about corporate dissolutions in
most jurisdictions. 1 3 2 Florida has a "deadlock" provision that allows dissolution by the circuit court upon petition of shareholders where the shareholders
The statute, however, is aimed at situations
or directors are deadlocked.'
where the shareholders are equally divided or where there is a deadlock of

123.
124.

See MBCA §75; 2 MBCA ANN. §75, 3 (2d ed. 1971, Supp. 1973).
But see MBCA §80; 2 MBCA ANN. §80, J2, 3.01 (2d ed. 1971, Supp. 1973).

125.

FLA. STAT.

126.
127.
128.
129.

ld. §608.23(l).
E.g., MBCA §81; 2 MBCA ANN. §81, 3.01 (2d ed. 1971, Supp. 1973).
2 MBCA ANN. §94, 3.03 (2d ed. 1971, Supp. 1973).
E.g., MBCA §94; 2 MBCA ANN. §94, 3.01 (2d ed. 1971, Supp. 1973).

130.

FLA. STAT.

§608.23(3) '1973).

§§608.36-.37 (1973). Note, however, that

FLA. STAT.

§§542.02-.03 (1973)

provide that any corporation violating the chapter dealing with combinations restricting
trade or commerce is subject 1o suit or quo warranto proceedings.
131. For example, the Model Business Corporation Act provides for dissolution by the
state where the corporation has procured its charter through fraud. See MBCA §94; 2 MBCA
3.03(3) (2d ed. 1971, Supp. 1973).
ANN. §94,
132. For example, MBCA §97 provides that an action by a shareholder may result in
a liquidation and dissolution where it is established "that the corporate assets are being
misapplied or wasted." 2 MBCA ANN. §97, I (2d ed. 1071).

133.

FLA. STAT.

§608.28 (1973).
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an even board, and it does not cover situations such as one in which board
of directors' activity is stalemated by a charter or statutory requirement for a
greater than majority vote. Apart from these deadlock situations, shareholders
of Florida corporations cannot initiate proceedings to liquidate a corporation,
and they may petition for the appointment of a receiver only after dissolution.3 4
In addition to insuring shareholder participation in dissolution, the state
has a further responsibility to protect creditors of the corporation. Thus,
-many statutes allow creditors with unsatisfied judgments to petition a court
to liquidate a corporation. 135 Under the Florida statute, creditors, like shareholders, may petition for appointment of trustees or receivers of the corporation after dissolution has occurred, but cannot invoke dissolution and liquidation themselves. 130 Moreover, where the proceedings are instigated by the
corporation, there is no adequate procedure for notice to creditors prior to
37
or even after dissolution.
Unlike statutes that require winding up and liquidation of the corporation
prior to dissolution, Florida provides for dissolution followed by the continuation as a "body corporate" for three years for the purpose of liquidation.238 Under this provision the directors continue as a board of trustees. 3 9
Apparently, claims are allowed at any time during the three years. It further
-appears that the trustees are not required to complete the liquidation within
three years and that actions against the trustees might continue indefinitely4 0
Foreign Corporations
Florida regulates foreign corporations holding property or transacting
business in the state in a brief chapter separate from the chapter on domestic
corporations.141 The statute requires corporations that "transact business, or
acquire, hold or dispose of property" in Florida must qualify as foreign
corporations. 42 Thus, the threshold question is whether a foreign corporation
has. become subject to regulation. Although a number of modern statutes
clarify the vague standard of transacting business by enumerating activities
1 43
that do not meet that standard, Florida leaves such clarification to case law.
134. FLA. STAT. §608.29(1) (1973).

135.

E.g., MBCA §97(b); 2 MBOA ANN. §97,
2(b), 3.01 (2d ed. 1971, Supp. 1973).
FLA. STAT. §608.29(1) (1973).
137. FLA. STAT. §608.27(1)(b) (1973) provides only for one publication of a "preliminary
notice of dissolution." No actual notice to creditors is required.
138. FLA. STAT. §608.30(1) (1973).
139. Id. §608.30(2).
140. For example, FLA. STAT. §608.30(3)(c) (1973) states: "The trustees shall continue
as trustees of the property of such dissolved corporation so long as it holds of record in
this state any [interest] in real property." In addition, property coming into the hands
of the trustees is not exempt from any "claim of lien or claim of right therein," and claims
may continue against shareholders as distributees. Id. §608.30(5).
141. FLA. STAT. §§613.01 et seq. (1973).
142. Id. §613.01.
143. See Schwartz v. Frango Corp., 44 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1950) (transactions in interstate
commerce); Crockin v. Boston Store, 137 Fla. 851, 188 So. 853 (1939) (single transactions
and collection of debts).
136.
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Fees required of foreign corporations are another area of uncertainty.
Before receiving a permit to do business in Florida, a foreign corporation
must pay a fee based upon its authorized capital stock. 144 The fee is similar
to that charged domestic corporations upon filing articles of incorporation,
except that the foreign corporation may "by affidavit" and other evidence
prove that the "capital employed in the state" is less than its total amount
of capital. 145 Nowhere does the statute articulate a method for determining
the "capital employed in the state."
Florida has no statutory procedure for the withdrawal of foreign corporations. Since Florida imposes certain continuing requirements such as securing
and maintaining a certificate to do business in the state,146 paying fees and
taxes, 147 and providing for service of process in the state, 148 there should be
some formal recognition by the state when a corporation ceases to do business
in Florida.
Close Corporation
At the time of its enactment, Florida's close corporation statute was designed to permit greater flexibility in the management of small corporations
than could be attained under the general corporation law., 9 The provisions
of part II, chapter 608, were restricted to "close" corporations so as not to
disturb the internal affairs of large ones. As a practical matter, it is unlikely
that large, publicly held corporations could avail themselves of provisions
in part II even if the statute so permitted. For example, few publicly held
corporations could provide for management of the business by shareholders,150 nor would many widely held corporations be affected by shareholders'
agreements.' 5'
Problems arise, however, by virtue of definitional restrictions, which limit
"close" corporations to those "whose shares of stock are not generally traded
in the markets maintained by securities dealers or brokers."' 52 There is no
case law interpreting these terms; thus, the lack of dearly drawn guidelines
leaves needless uncertainty in determining whether a particular corporation
may conduct its affairs as a close corporation.".3 Corporations that in a
144.
145.
146.

FLA. STAT.

§613.02(1)

(1973).

Id.
Id. §613.01.

147. Id. §613.02(1).
148. Id. §48.019.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-379, § I
FLA. STAT. §608.72 (1973).
Id. §608.75.
Id. §608.70.

153. Many provisions applying exclusively to close corporations are either missing in
the general corporation statute or completely contrary to general corporation laws. For
example. §608.72 provides that the business of close corporations may be managed by
stockholders, while §608.09(1) requires management of general corporations by directors.
Section 608.75 provides for "shareholders' agreements" in close corporations, even to the
extent that the parties treat the corporation as a partnership, but there is no corresponding
provision in the general statute, and case law would hold many such agreements invalid.
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practical sense are close corporations might be denied the flexibility contemplated by part II. Moreover, the divergent provisions could hinder the development of small business enterprises, since growth would result in loss of
close corporation advantages. Modern statutes dispense with the need for a
separate law by providing flexibility for all corporations under a general
statute.5 4 Thus, definitional problems are eliminated and corporations may
be managed in whatever manner agreed upon by the shareholders.
THE PROPOSED FLORIDA CORPORATION ACT

Florida's corporation statute was enacted over twenty years ago. 5 5 Although
the 1953 Act was a complete revision of the corporation statutes, it apparently was put together in haste and represented an amalgamation of many
views." 0 Since that time the patching on of additions and supplements has
exacerbated problems in the original Act. In many instances, amendatory
provisions have not been placed logically within the Act, and the language
of the amendments has been inconsistent with existing language.' 57 In addition, despite attempts to modernize the law, Florida's corporation statute remains silent upon numerous matters of concern to corporate practitioners.
Thus, the Florida Law Revision Council in 1971 decided that an updating
of the Act should be considered.
In view of the many problems that exist under the Florida General Corporation Law, it became apparent that any meaningful revision necessarily
must involve a complete restructuring. The choices were: a complete rewriting
and realignment of the existing Florida law; adaptation and adoption of the
law of another selected jurisdiction, such a Delaware; or adoption of some
form of a model or uniform act, such as the Model Business Corporation
Act (MBCA). Any one of these choices would present a new law to Florida
corporate attorneys, with all of the attendant problems. Of the three possibilities, however, adaptation of the MBCA appeared to offer the most advantages.
The MBCA is the only model or uniform legislation relating to corporations. 158 The MBCA was proposed in 1950 by the Committee on Corporate
Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association. The Section has continued to revise the law from
154. See I MBCA ANN. §35, %2, at 756-59; 3.02 (2d ed. 1971); 1 MBCA ANN. §35, ff3.01
(Supp. 1973).
155. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28,170, §1.
156. See Wright, supra note 10, at 51.
157. This is illustrated by the indemnification provisions, some of which were patched
into the statute in 1963. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-286, §1. These provisions generally give
corporations the power to indemnify officers and directors, and for that reason they were
placed under the general powers section of the statute. FLA. STAT. §608.13(14) (1973). However,
§608.13(14)(c) provides that to the extent a director, officer, employee, or agent of a corporation has been successful in defense of an action or proceeding against him, he shall be
indemnified by the corporation. Thus, rather than merely bestowing a power upon the
corporation, this section places an obligation upon the corporation and a right in the director, officer, employee, or agent.
158. 1 W. FLzrCHFR, supra note 1, §2.2 (perm. ed. rev. 1963).
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time to time, issuing a revised draft in 1969.159 Some twenty-three states have
adopted the MBCA in substance; many other states, like Florida, have enacted
portions of the Act. 160
Adaptation of the MBCA offers several significant benefits to Florida and
the practicing bar. A brief reading of the table of sections to the MBCA
demonstrates that it is far better organized than the Florida law. It is more
comprehensive than Florida's statutes, not only in the number of topics
161
covered, but in the depth of treatment given various corporate problems.
In addition, most practitioners are aware of the lack of corporate case law in
Florida. With an act similar to that of many other jurisdictions, Florida attorneys would have a greater spectrum of precedents to follow in areas where
the statute requires interpretation. Finally, continuous revision by the
American Bar Association section would be a source from which the Florida
Legislature could obtain constant modernization of its corporate law if it
should so choose.
Thus, the MBCA was used as the basis for the draft of the revision of
Florida's corporation law. Changes were made, however, to preserve desirable
features of the present Florida law, to select among different forms of the
MBCA as adopted in other jurisdictions or to cure minor problems in the
6
MBCA.1 2
Adoption of the proposed Florida Corporation Act' 63 will not work many

159. ld. (Supp. 1973).
160. 1 MBCA ANN. §1, g2 (2d ed. 1971, Supp. 1973). As has been discussed previously,
the indemnification provisions in Florida's present statute were modeled after the MBCA
provision. FLA. STAT. §§608.13(14)-(17) (1973). Florida allows indemnification of a director,
officer, employee, or agent of the corporation only if the person acted "in the reasonable
belief that such action was in the best interest of the corporation." Id. §608.13(14) (emphasis
added). The MBCA provision has been modified since its adoption in Florida and now allows indemnification if the party acted in a manner "not opposed to the best interests of
the corporation." MBCA §5 (emphasis added). The problem with the earlier MBCA provision and the present Florida provision may best be illustrated by an example involving
insider trading. Liability in such cases is based upon a person's status as an officer or director; thus, indemnification should extend to these cases to the extent permitted by the
securities laws. Insider trading cases, however, concern persons dealing in the corporation's
securities for their own account and not necessarily for the best interest of the corporation.
Therefore, such individuals rarely meet the "best interest" test. Thus, in such cases fairness
dictates that the question of indemnification should turn on whether the insider had reason
to believe his trading might inure to the corporation's detriment. Accordingly, the proposed
law adopts the current Model Act provision instead of retaining Florida's present law
on this point.
161. For example, the Florida statute deals, in one brief sentence, with the purchase by
a corporation of its own shares. FLA. SIAT. §608.13(9)(b) (1973), while the MBCA devotes
a separate section to the treatment of such purchases. MBCA §6.
162. For example, the MBCA, like the corporation statutes of most states, permits
voting by proxy but does not deal with the subject in a comprehensive manner. See text
accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
163. A draft of the proposed law was filed in both houses of the Florida Legislature
in the spring of 1974. Fla. S. 383 (Reg. Sess. 1974, introduced by S. Johnson); Fla. H.R.
3673 (Reg. Sess. 1974, introduced by Rep. Crabtree and others). It was not anticipated
that the draft, as filed, would be enacted at that time. The proposed law was introduced
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substantive changes in Florida law. It will 'not require Florida practitioners
to learn a whole new terminology as some other model acts have done, nor
will it present broad policy questions of general public concern. While experienced Florida corporate practitioners already know the Florida -tatute
well and may not be troubled by its organizational deficiencies, the new act
will be a great benefit to the average lawyer who is not constantly involved
in corporation law problems. In addition, the new act will present a less
confusing and more certain path for the Florida business community to
follow.

then in order to provide a year for comment from practitioners, professors, aid 6thers
familiar with the corporate law before considering passage of the law in its final form.
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